Files\\Copy\\Bano and Falki - 2016 - Sino-African Strategic Partnership and Stratagem o - § 2 references coded [ 0.39% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.32% Coverage

The ﬁrst phase of China’s aid to Africa was a purely ideological one. The rela~ons among states were based on ideological orienta~on. African states were also looking for diploma~c and ﬁnancial support from the poli~cal allies to advance their na~onalist movements for independence. China assisted many African states in the form of economic, technical, poli~cal and military support as a counter to the policy of western imperialism

Reference 2 - 0.07% Coverage

In this phase China seemed less concerned with the type of regime and their ideological posi~ons.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2006 China’s Engagement in Africa scope significance and consequences - § 7 references coded [ 1.55% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.16% Coverage

By oﬀering aid without preconditions, China has presented an attractive alternative to conditional Western aid, and gained valuable diplomatic support to defend its international interests.

Reference 2 - 0.29% Coverage

However, a generally asymmetrical relationship diﬀering little from previous African–Western patterns, alongside support of authoritarian governments at the expense of human rights, make the economic consequences ofincreased Chinese involvement in Africa mixed at best, while the political consequences are bound to prove deleterious

Reference 3 - 0.09% Coverage

However, the limited ﬁnancial value of China’s aid is considerably enhanced by political considerations.

Reference 4 - 0.41% Coverage

Africa’s resource-rich countries are in a position to provide an ample percentage of China’s requirements. There is little doubt that natural resources are at the core of China’s economic interests in Africa – or perhaps even its overall interest in the continent. In terms of China’s imports from Africa, nine of its ten most important trading partners are resourcerich countries. Remarkably, the list even includes emerging oil producer Chad, one of the few African countries to recognise Taiwan.

Reference 5 - 0.19% Coverage

In return, Beijing can count on valuable diplomatic support from   
African governments to defend its interests at the international level, particularly in multilateral organisations with ‘one country – one vote’ arrangements.

Reference 6 - 0.17% Coverage

This enables China to gain political inﬂuence, which often opens the doors to commercially or strategically more attractive businesses in other sectors, e.g. to win tenders for oil and mining concessions

Reference 7 - 0.25% Coverage

By dispensing soft loans and credit lines, development assistance, gifts and other incentives, arms deliveries and diplomatic backing, Beijing seeks to cultivate the favour of governments in oil-producing states and, by extension, obtain privileged access and opportunities for its companies.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2007 China and Africa- Building a Strategic Partnership - § 9 references coded [ 1.88% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.28% Coverage

Another even more important reason was that China needed to acquire support from as many African countries as possible in order to gain the seat it so desired at the UN. The investment in the search for allies in Africa paid up handsomely in 1971 when 26 of the 50 African states in the UN voted for the Albanian resolution to seat Communist China in the UN (Akindele, 1985; Hutchinson, 1975; Weinstein, 1975)

Reference 2 - 0.54% Coverage

One major factor was the western powers’ condemnation of China’s bloody suppression of the democratization movement in Tiananmen Square in Beijing on 4 June 1989, which abruptly ended China’s ‘honeymoon’ with the West. Isolated and strongly resenting the West’s new-found critique of its human rights record and the perceived meddling in its domestic affairs (Committee on International Relations, 2005), China embarked on a concerted campaign to renew and widen its contacts in the developing world in an attempt to counter and resist the criticism endured at the hands of the West (Jacobeit, 1998; Taylor, 1998a). What was typical of this diplomatic offensive was the offering of aid and promotion of economic linkages and investment to supportive states.

Reference 3 - 0.18% Coverage

Following the Tiananmen Square incident, non-interference in state sovereignty and freedom from hegemony were increasingly reasserted as key themes in China’s foreign policy, no less so in Africa where it has been music to the ears of many African dictators

Reference 4 - 0.06% Coverage

First, Africa is rich in the natural resources required to feed Chinese industry.

Reference 5 - 0.12% Coverage

Second, Africa’s population of over 700 million was singled out as an enormous potential market for China’s relatively inexpensive low- and medium-grade consumer product

Reference 6 - 0.13% Coverage

several African countries were identiﬁ ed as key targets for proﬁ table long-term investments, where the emphasis was clearly on oil-producing nations and those with growing economies.

Reference 7 - 0.24% Coverage

Close study of these documents and China’s current activities in Africa reveal that Chinese motives for establishing a strategic partnership with Africa are primarily economic: the drive for resource security as well as new markets and investment opportunities are all of great signiﬁ cance to the sustainable growth of China’s econom

Reference 8 - 0.16% Coverage

Chinese leaders continue to be interested in forging a political alliance with African states in a determined effort to combat western, and in particular US, hegemony and circumscribe Taiwan’s diplomatic space on the continent

Reference 9 - 0.17% Coverage

With its emergence as a signiﬁ cant world player in the era of neoliberal globalization, China has returned to Africa on a larger scale than ever before and with the ideological and ﬁ nancial resources to compete for political and economic inﬂ uence.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2008 Giles Mohan New African Choices The Politics of Chinese Engagement - § 3 references coded [ 0.66% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.13% Coverage

We want to stress that China has always engaged strategically with Africa and used the continent to bolster its geopolitical interests, which marks it out as similar to other superpowers

Reference 2 - 0.37% Coverage

Aid was also an important geopolitical tool for the Chinese in the contest with Taiwan (also an aid giver) and the USSR (where the Chinese aimed to shame the Kremlin by stepping up their charity and economic aid and by providing fewer arms). Aid thus became an important way of exposing the limitations of China’s opponents, both western and Soviet. There was often a reluctance however to coordinate efforts with other foreign powers and a deepseated tendency to ‘go it alone’, sometimes resulting in active hostility to other aid personnel.

Reference 3 - 0.17% Coverage

Whilst re-affirming older principles of non-interference and the ‘one China’ policy, it emphasises trade, investment and economic co-operation as the basis for engagement and also outlines China’s intention to deepen political relations.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2009 Chinas diplomacy toward Africa drivers and constraints1[retrieved\_2020-09-21] - § 1 reference coded [ 0.14% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.14% Coverage

In sum, from Beijing’s point of view, Africa is a continent that is vital   
for China’s continued economic growth as well as an important component in shaping China’s inﬂuence and prestige as a major power.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2010 Samy China’s Aid Policies in Africa Opportunities and - § 7 references coded [ 1.45% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.22% Coverage

These are means for the Chinese to secure access to important resources, to engage in mutually beneﬁcial trade and investment, and for furthering their political objectives, namely continued recognition of the one-China policy.

Reference 2 - 0.27% Coverage

First, China’s aid policies in Africa have been inextricably linked to its overall foreign policy objectives, and it has responded to its own political and strategic interests in crafting its engagement in Africa, much like the traditional   
China’s Aid Policies in Africa 83   
donors did.

Reference 3 - 0.17% Coverage

econd, the recent renewed interest, while certainly more economic than ideological, reﬂects the Chinese appetite for securing long-term supplies of oil and other natural resource

Reference 4 - 0.19% Coverage

The Chinese also see Africa as a potentially huge market for their low-skilled labour-intensive products, and the trade and foreign direct investment data on China–Africa conﬁrm this very clearly.

Reference 5 - 0.14% Coverage

Foreign aid is thus seen as a means not only to help other developing countries but   
also to create economic linkages that can be mutually beneﬁcial.

Reference 6 - 0.21% Coverage

Another concern expressed by civil society is that the exchange of natural resources   
for manufactured goods is starting a new ‘colonial’ relationship that will prevent Africa from developing its own manufacturing capacity.

Reference 7 - 0.25% Coverage

Second, the objective of Chinese aid is not only to gain access to resources as is commonly reported, but also to ﬁnd new markets for its products through trade and investment. In fact, in many cases it is diﬃcult to disentangle aid from trade and investment policies.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2011 Bräutigam Aid ‘With Chinese Characteristics’ Chinese Foreig - § 1 reference coded [ 0.30% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.30% Coverage

Although there is much speculation that the practice is widespread, the existing evidence suggests that China does not use its ofﬁcial foreign assistance budget to support bids for oil investments or natural resource concessions (Bräutigam, 2009: 277–281).

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2012 China as a net donor tracking dollars and sense - § 4 references coded [ 0.61% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.18% Coverage

hina does have some economic interests in the region in terms of securing supplies of raw materials in Trinidad and Tobago (gas and asphalt), Jamaica (bauxite) and Guyana (timber, bauxite, minerals), but these are secondary motivations, given that such resources can be sourced elsewhere in the world.

Reference 2 - 0.08% Coverage

Western commentators have analysed China’s so-called ‘charm   
offensive’ in Asia, Latin America and, more recently, Africa, and suggest that

Reference 3 - 0.06% Coverage

Beijing has made signiﬁcant soft power gains, especially relative to Washington (Kurlantzick 2007).

Reference 4 - 0.29% Coverage

This ‘correct line’ is rooted in the foreign policy of the CCP, and the ‘Three Worlds Theory’ originally articulated by Mao Zedong, and rearticulated by Deng Xiaoping in his historic April 1974 speech at the UN, in which he insisted that China belonged with the Third World, and his statements thereafter that China ‘shares a common destiny with the Third World’, that China will continue to ‘serve the interests of the developing world, regardless of how successful it may be in developing’ (Deng 1987, 46).

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2012 Indra De Soysa Enter The Dragon An Empirical Analysis of Chinese versus US - § 3 references coded [ 0.30% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.09% Coverage

The ﬁndings show that popular perceptions about China’s role in Africa do not match reality, particularly when assessed against the current hegemon’s behavior.

Reference 2 - 0.09% Coverage

Today, China is indeed more visible in Africa, but this might simply reﬂect its economic and demographic size and its dependence on natural resources.

Reference 3 - 0.12% Coverage

Another reason for skepticism about China and its   
motives in Africa plausibly stems from great-power rivalry for resources and markets, if not power, which may skew mutual perceptions among great powers.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2013 Brant Chinese Aid in the South Pacific Linked to Resour - § 10 references coded [ 2.56% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.20% Coverage

Drawing particularly upon interviews and site visits in Fiji and Papua New Guinea, it argues that although major commercial resource contracts do appear to be supported by Chinese Government assistance, resources deals are not explicitly part ofChinese foreign aid in the region.

Reference 2 - 0.11% Coverage

Chinese aid in the South Paciﬁc should not be viewed (and dismissed) as simply an element of Beijing’s strategy to secure access to natural resources.

Reference 3 - 1.13% Coverage

analysing China’s (state and commercial) involvement in the resources sector.   
Aid for Resources? The Chinese Government (along with many developing country leaders) stresses the concepts of “win-win”, “equal partnership” and “mutual beneﬁt” in the objectives and operation of Chinese aid. In reality, like most countries, China’s provision of foreign aid is utilised to further its foreign policy objectives. Chinese foreign policy expert Linda Jakobson (2011) explains that China’s “core interests” boil down to concerns about sovereignty, security and development. She cites high-ranking Chinese foreign policy ofﬁcial, Dai Bingguo, elaborating upon these as: China’s political stability (stability of the CCP leadership and socialist system); sovereign security; and China’s sustainable economic and social development. Chinese scholars such as Ding (2008, p. 195) concur, explaining that the ofﬁcial basic goals of China’s foreign policy are to “preserve China’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity”, and to “create a favourable international environment for China’s reform and opening up and modernisation construction”. In terms of more speciﬁc objectives of foreign aid, these can be broadly deﬁned as serving economic growth and development (both in other developing countries and within China), geopolitical imperatives, and China’s desire to be seen as a responsible actor.4 The program for each recipient country features different elements of these objectives   
according to variations in the local situation and what each

Reference 4 - 0.11% Coverage

With this background in mind, it should not be surprising that foreign aid is sometimes used as leverage or an entry point for longer-term economic engagement

Reference 5 - 0.25% Coverage

There is no denying that Chinese aid in the region contains “national interest” objec-   
tives, as it does throughout the rest of the “developing world”, but what the dominant analysis in reality objects to is not that China has a “strategic interest” in the region per se, but rather that it is potentially affecting Western “strategic interests”.

Reference 6 - 0.16% Coverage

It is clear that China’s aid programs are directed towards supporting China’s national   
interests in some fashion, but in the Paciﬁc at least, this does not take the form of being focused primarily on the natural resources sector.

Reference 7 - 0.10% Coverage

whilst access to resources is an important part of China’s engagement in the region, it is not a speciﬁc part of its aid policy and agreements.

Reference 8 - 0.12% Coverage

The fact that the loan is taken out with the China Development Bank (CDB) provides further evidence that this is the case, as CDB does not provide concessional aid funding.

Reference 9 - 0.28% Coverage

These brief examples indicate where a signiﬁcant difference exists between Chinese   
foreign aid and Western aid – in the willingness for the Chinese Government to use its aid program to support Chinese commercial projects, either to help facilitate the agreement in the ﬁrst place, or to assist when the company faces local community backlash, or more generally to support the investment itself.

Reference 10 - 0.10% Coverage

Current policies suggest that the resources sector is   
174 Philippa Brant   
not an overriding focus or objective of Chinese aid in the region.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2013 Warmerdam Having, Giving, Taking Lessons on Ownership in Ch - § 2 references coded [ 0.38% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.20% Coverage

China’s economic engagement provides recipients with access to alternative   
sources of ﬁnance. However, the extent to which recipients enjoy this access to Chinese ﬁnance is dependent on whether there are Chinese interests in the recipient, and the attractiveness of the recipient nation’s investment climate.

Reference 2 - 0.18% Coverage

Additionally, countries with resources vital to China’s booming manufacturing sectors, such as Zambia which is one of the largest suppliers of copper to China, could see their bargaining position improving as the strategic importance of their resources gains strength

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2014 Hameiri China’s ‘charm offensive’ in the Pacific and Australia’s regional order - § 4 references coded [ 1.12% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.25% Coverage

that increased flows of Chinese aid, as well as trade and investment, into the Pacific Islands Region, do not reflect a Chinese strategy for regional domination, or even a more limited resource security agenda. Rather, Chinese aid to the region is driven by commercial interests from below and is therefore also more fragmented than is often assumed.

Reference 2 - 0.13% Coverage

This argument was demonstrated through an analysis of Chinese aid in general and to the Pacific in particular. It is hard to find evidence of any strategic direction in how aid is allocated.

Reference 3 - 0.31% Coverage

he impression of a rising China has little to do with the actual nature of its aid program. It is rather produced through the actions and words of Pacific leaders keen to dilute Australia’s influence in particular. Australia is incredibly preponderant in this region and the Australian government has used its aid to push through an intrusive and regulatory regional governance agenda, designed to improve the ‘effectiveness’ of PICs.

Reference 4 - 0.43% Coverage

In the case of Fiji, it is clearly the post-coup Fijian government that has promoted the view that Chinese power is on the rise in the Pacific and Australia’s on the wane. This strategy has had some   
19   
success in getting Australian officials to soften their stance on Fiji’s diplomatic isolation and attempt to reengage Fiji, as well as in reigniting the US government’s interest in the region. In this sense, Chinese aid has real political significance in the Pacific, not because of what it is, but because of a perception, largely unbacked by evidence, that China’s rise heralds the possibility of a new Cold War.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2014 Kitano China’s Foreign Aid at a Transitional Stage - § 1 reference coded [ 0.10% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.10% Coverage

the natural resource endowments of host countries are not a major determinant of China’s foreign aid

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2014 The forum on China-Africa Cooperation,Ideas and Aid National Interest or Strategic Partnership - § 2 references coded [ 0.37% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.06% Coverage

its aid disbursements are in line with its foreign policy objectives.

Reference 2 - 0.31% Coverage

Again its aid to Africa is carefully orchestrated to gain support on a number of international issues, as well as to bolster its international standing in institutions such as the UN, the World Trade Organization and others. For instance, in 1971, China received overwhelming support from 26 African states to gain a seat in the UNSC, at the expense of Taiwan

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2015 Axel Dreher Rogue aid An empirical analysis of China’s aid allocation - § 12 references coded [ 1.33% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.03% Coverage

we ﬁnd that politically aligned countries receive   
more aid from China

Reference 2 - 0.06% Coverage

We ﬁnd only mixed evidence that Chinese aid ﬂows are targeted at countries that are of high economic importance to China

Reference 3 - 0.14% Coverage

Overall, there is no evidence that China gives more aid to countries that are geographically closer, which is contrary to the results in Dreher et al. (2011) for other non-DAC donors. China, having global ambitions, seems to behave differently than the other (smaller) emerging donors.

Reference 4 - 0.06% Coverage

Quantitatively, the share of China’s aid budget a democracy receives is 0.74 percentage points lower compared tonon-democracies.

Reference 5 - 0.12% Coverage

The results show that recognition of Taiwan is important for a country’s aid   
share. At the 1% level of signiﬁcance, countries recognizing Taiwan have received signiﬁcantly less aid since the 1979–1987 period compared to those recognizing Taiwan.

Reference 6 - 0.16% Coverage

Compared to the average aid share of0.66, this reduction is ofsubstantial magnitude. This is in line with the evidence that Taiwan recognizers usually do not receive Chinese aid at all. Quantitatively, the impact of recognition is even more important in the third phase and less important in the fourth phase compared to the ﬁfth.

Reference 7 - 0.12% Coverage

n all phases, countries voting in line with China (or voting against Taiwan up   
to 1971) receive a larger aid share. The marginal effect is statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels, with the exception of the most recent period (1996–2005).

Reference 8 - 0.11% Coverage

The quantitative impact of voting is sizable. In the 1956–1969 period, a country changing its voting behaviour from zero to one (i.e., from always voting with Taiwan to never) receives an aid share that is 4.14 percentage points higher.

Reference 9 - 0.19% Coverage

With respect to commercial interests, we again ﬁnd some evidence that they are correlated with aid allocation decisions. In particular, there is some evidence that large aid amounts, more medical teams and more food aid ﬂow to countries importing from China. With the exception of medical staff dispatched, we ﬁnd no evidence that China’s aid allocation is associated with natural resource endowments.

Reference 10 - 0.08% Coverage

We found evidence that trade interests matter, but no (robust) evidence that recipient countries with larger oil production or bad governance are favoured.

Reference 11 - 0.10% Coverage

export interests seem to be linked to China’s   
aid allocation in the period after the onset of economic reforms under Deng Xiaoping(1979–1989)andduring themost recent period ofoursample (1996–2006).

Reference 12 - 0.16% Coverage

The results also show some evidence that China follows recipient needs when   
deciding on its aid allocation, as it favours countries with low per-capita income. However, this positive ﬁnding is mitigated by the signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient on recipient population size: it is easier to buy policy concessions from smaller countries

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2016 Dennis D. Institutional Mismatch and Chinese in the Philippines Challenges and Opportunities - § 2 references coded [ 0.21% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.07% Coverage

China’s aid allotments to Southeast Asia are closely linked to its broad foreign policy goals.

Reference 2 - 0.14% Coverage

Due to their geographical proximity to China’s western regions,   
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam play a vital role in the realization of China’s Great Western development strategy.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2016 Domestic actors and agendas in Chinese aid policy - § 1 reference coded [ 0.18% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.18% Coverage

The extent to which China uses aid as a tool of soft power is debatable, as in addition to deliberately utilising overseas assistance to enhance diplomatic efforts, Chinese aid has had both positive and negative unintended diplomatic consequences.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2016 Marica Don China’s Coherence in International Eonomic Governance - § 2 references coded [ 0.08% Coverage]

References 1-2 - 0.08% Coverage

More recently, its aid to African states has been aimed at acquiring the natural resources necessary to foster domestic economic development.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2017 Furuoka Determinants of China’s and Japan’s Foreign Aid Al - § 3 references coded [ 3.19% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.13% Coverage

The main ﬁnding was that the provision offoreign aid by China and Japan was primarily driven by the aid donors’ selfinterest.

Reference 2 - 2.54% Coverage

Empirical results from the pooled OLS analysis are reported in Table 3. Among the four main determinants, the aid donors’ selfinterest (DOI) and the recipients’ material needs (MAN) were found to have a statistically signiﬁcant relationship with the foreign aid allocations. In the case ofChina’s foreign aid, the DOIhad a statistically signiﬁcant positive association while the MANhad a statistically signiﬁcant negative association with the aid allocation. These ﬁndings indicate that the Chinese government provided larger amounts offoreign aid to the African countries with higher national incomes and lower levels ofmaterial wellbeing. The other two variables — the health-longevity needs (HLN) and the medical-hygiene needs (MHN) — were found to have no statistically signiﬁcant relationships with the provisions of China’s foreign aid. In a similar way, the DOI had a statistically signiﬁcant positive relationship and the MANhad a statistically signiﬁcant negative relationship with Japan’s foreign aid allocation. At the same time, the HLNand the MHNhad no statistically signiﬁcant association with Japan’s aid allocation in Africa. These ﬁndings suggest that China’s and Japan’s foreign aid allocations were determined by the donor countries’ selfinterest as well as by the recipient countries’ material needs. The ﬁndings also indicate that both China’s and Japan’s aid allocations were not affected by the health-longevity condition and health-hygiene situation in the aid recipient countries. Thus, there was no difference in the determinants for China’s and Japan’s foreign aid provision. Next, the ﬁndings from the one-way ﬁxed effects method are presented in Table 4. They indicate that all four main determinants — the DOI, the MAN, the HLN and the MHN— had no statistically signiﬁcant relationship with China’s and Japan’s aid allocations. In other words, neither China’s nor Japan’s aid allocations were affected by these four determinants. A possible explanation for this result is that the variables were not properly ‘re-scaled’ by the logarithm transformation method. It is also possible that the choice of the variables was too narrow. Table 5 shows the ﬁndings from the two-way ﬁxed effects model. They were consistent with those obtained from the one-way effects analysis. Thus, it was found that all four main determinants, namely, the DOI, the MAN, the HLNand the MHN, had no

Reference 3 - 0.52% Coverage

Both countries tended to provide larger amounts of foreign aid to the African countries with a bigger market size. Additionally, the size of population was a prominent element to inﬂuence China’s and Japan’s aid allocations. Among minor discrepancies in the patterns of foreign aid provision between China and Japan was that the latter tended to give an additional consideration to the material needs, the medical and hygiene conditions and the quality of governance in the aid recipient countries.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2017 Kishi Chinese Official Finance and State Repression in A - § 4 references coded [ 0.63% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.16% Coverage

China sends official finance to many different institutional contexts: Ghana and Kenya receive large shares, as do Sudan and Zimbabwe. Indeed across Africa, only Burkina Faso, Swaziland, and the Gambiaii official finance from 2000-2013, owing to their stance in support of Taiwan.

References 2-3 - 0.20% Coverage

Chinese donors have varied agendas that do not conform to mandates around present and future institutional change (Dreher and Fuchs, 2015). These agendas include accessing resources, creating new markets, and building international coalitions through creating closer ties with non-Western states, such as those in Africa (Tull, 2006; Adisu et al., 2010).

Reference 4 - 0.27% Coverage

n comparison to other international donors, Chinese economic and commercial considerations are priorities (Dreher and Fuchs, 2015). China’s need for natural resources to sustain economic growth and interest in accessing resources (e.g. oil, bauxite) is complemented by the desire to: develop new markets through trade and investment, engage in symbolic diplomacy and development, and forge strategic partnerships, in line with its ‘one China’ policy (Adisu et al., 2010; Samy, 2010).

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2017 Palina Prysmakova Chinese Intergovernmental Relations and World Development - § 3 references coded [ 0.40% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.15% Coverage

the Chinese central government do not plan to dominate Africa and other regions of the world, which is often used as an argument by those with a misperception of the nature of the Chinese state and political economy.

Reference 2 - 0.15% Coverage

International altruism is a rare case. Drawing from the previous sections, we can expect that investing in Belarus, the Chinese pursue their own interests, often the interests of particular government officials.

Reference 3 - 0.10% Coverage

Local Chinese enterprises and governments request centrally managed export credit agencies to finance their projects in a developing country.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2018 Pippa Morgan Ideology and Relationality Chinese Aid in Africa - § 6 references coded [ 0.99% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.32% Coverage

As existing systematic cross-country data collection efforts4 focus on China’s post-2000 aid, most crosscountry empirical studies of Chinese aid do not systematically analyze China’s historical aid. An exception is Dreher and Fuchs (2015), who quantitatively compare Chinese aid from the 1950s to the present day with that of Western donors, finding that it has been driven by interest-based economic (trade) and political (UN voting, Taiwan) considerations.

Reference 2 - 0.19% Coverage

empirical results for prereform Chinese aid. As expected, there is a statistically significant, positive relationship between leftist regime ideology and the number of Chinese ODA-like aid projects a recipient receives per country-year between 1956 and 1978 (model one).

Reference 3 - 0.08% Coverage

African countries with a leftist regime ideology received more Mao era Chinese aid, all other things being equal.

Reference 4 - 0.18% Coverage

Paradoxically, it appears that the African relationships formed during China’s most ideological phase of foreign policy in the late 1950s and 1960s still exert an influence on Chinese policymakers’ aid allocation decisions today as they seek to maintain long-stand

Reference 5 - 0.14% Coverage

Nonetheless, the polarized range of responses within these   
countries suggests that “traditional friendship” is not sufficient to ensure the large amounts of Chinese aid are always well received.

Reference 6 - 0.08% Coverage

material   
interest explanations of China’s contemporary aid based on an assumption of pragmatism are incomplete.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2019 Pippa Morgan Can China’s Economic Statecraft Win Soft Power in Africa - § 6 references coded [ 0.98% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.08% Coverage

China’s investment and aid, on the other hand, generally make a positive contribution to Chinese soft power in Africa

Reference 2 - 0.16% Coverage

In   
Africa, China’s primary instrument for charming other nations is economic statecraft: through maneuvering of trade, aid and investment, China hopes to win over African citizens and leaders, and thus improve its influence over the continen

Reference 3 - 0.19% Coverage

Although culture, values, and institutions are typically considered the primary instruments ofsoft power, African opinions on China are primarily driven by China’s economic activities, making aid, trade and investment fundamental to Chinese efforts to build soft power on the continent

Reference 4 - 0.21% Coverage

negative perceptions of China among Africans are fueled primarily by trade and small-scale investment related issues, in particular trading of poor quality, cheap Chinese manufactures. Contrary to popular Western perceptions, China’s extraction of resources is not the major source of resentment for African citizens.

Reference 5 - 0.12% Coverage

In practice, contemporary China draws on both cultural (e.g. Confucius Institutes and Chinese television networks) and economic (aid, trade, and investment) tools to build its soft power.

Reference 6 - 0.22% Coverage

Contrary to popular perceptions in Western media and scholarship, Chinese aid and infrastructure invest-   
ments are generally viewed in a positive light and contribute to China’ssoft power Bcharm offensive^ in Africa, and China’s resource extraction and support for nondemocratic governments are not dominant sources of criticism.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2019 Seven decades of Chinese state financingin Africa - § 3 references coded [ 0.53% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.16% Coverage

as with other donors, China remains a highly pragmatic development partner. China’s leaders have consistently viewed aid as an important geopolitical tool in Africa that yields a range of economic, political and security beneﬁts

Reference 2 - 0.08% Coverage

In short, a complex spectrum of strategic interests have informed Chinese state ﬁnancing since its inception.

Reference 3 - 0.29% Coverage

Of course, China’s contemporary aid to Africa is not apolitical. As in earlier periods, China’s government continues to deploy ODA and other forms of development ﬁnance to further isolate Taiwan in the international community. In addition, China appears to provide larger amounts of aid to African governments that align their United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) votes closely to those of China (Dreher et al. 2018).